Prices Versus Quantities in a Vintage
Introduction
It is well-established in the economic literature that regulating pollution through prices (e.g. emission charges) or quantities (e.g. emission quotas) is equivalent. Both yield the same resource allocation and welfare level. In his seminal paper Weitzman [16] showed that such equivalence does not hold anymore when information is imperfect, be it on pollution abatement costs or damages. Following Weitzman, many papers elaborated on the uncertainty issue and the choice of policy instrument (for some recent papers, see Zhao [17] , Krysiac [12] ). A few authors introduced alternative motives for which this equivalence may not hold. As examples, Finkelshtain and Kisley [8] found political motives, and Kelly [10] stressed the role of general equilibrium effects. The contribution of our paper is to shown that this equivalence may not hold even under perfect information, but simply because the capital stock that generates pollution is not homogeneous. In a vintage capital model, reducing pollution requires to change the capital structure through investment in cleaner machines and scrapping the more poluting ones. In such a setting we show that emission tax and auction emission permits may yield contrasting outcomes.
The heterogeneity of the available physical capital with respect to productivity and emission intensity is an important factor for policy design, especially in the presence of emission restrictions. To decide which machines to scrap and which machines to buy is an indispensable right of the firm's management. The vintage model of a firm that we employ is essentially a version of the one introduced in [1, 2] and investigated by several authors (see also [6, 7] and the bibliography therein). In particular, the model allows for investing and scrapping in technologies of any vintage. 1 Polluting emissions are regulated either by a tax or with auctioned pollution permits.
When the price of emission is endogenized with an auction (and not set as a tax) it has to be determined by a market equilibrium equation that involves the emission paths resulting from the optimal behavior of the participating firms. The derivation and the investigation of this equation is the main goal of this paper. It turns out that the equation for the auction price of emissions (being a Fredholm integral equation of the first kind) is ill-posed, in the sense that (i) it may fail to have a solution; (ii) it may have multiple solutions; (iii) it may not have a positive solution (in which case the solution does not represent a market price); (iv) the solution, even it it exists and is unique and positive, may be highly volatile and fluctuating. For this reason we introduce periodwise restrictions on the emission, which correspond to the commitment periods in the terminology of the Kyoto protocol. It is argued below that such a period-wise emission restriction plays a regularizing role on the auction price of emissions. Namely, a sufficiently large commitment period ensures existence, uniqueness (under somewhat restrictive conditions) and (according to numerical evidence) positiveness of the solution of the auction price equation. In addition it decreases the volatility of the auction market.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model of a firm facing exogenous cost for emissions, and we characterize its optimal behavior. The model is of vintage-type, that is, the physical capital is differentiated with respect to technologies of different dates. In Section 3 we present some properties and analytic expressions of the emission of the firm along its optimal path as a function of the exogenous costs. Based on this, in Section 4 we investigate the equilibrium equation for the auction of emission permits and introduce period-wise emission restrictions (commitment periods) as a tool for regularization of the auction price. Then in Section 5 we present some numerical results supporting the regularizing role of the period-wise emission restrictions.
The firm's problem with exogenous price of emission
The model of the firm presented below is a version of the PDE-vintage models introduced in [1, 2] and further investigated and applied in a large number of contribution (see [6, 7] and the literature therein). The formal difference of our model with the abovementioned ones is technical and not essential from a methodological point of view.
First we describe the basic model of a firm that is composed of machines of different vintages (technologies) τ : K(τ, s) will denote the capital stock of vintage τ and of age s. That is, K(τ, t − τ ) is the stock of vintage τ that exists at time t ≥ τ . The maximal life-time of machines of each technology will be denoted by ω, and the depreciation rate of each technology -by δ. Both are assumed independent of the vintage just for notational convenience. At any time t > 0 the firm may invest with intensity I(τ, s) in machines of vintage τ that are of age s at time t (so that s = t − τ ).
The planning horizon of the firm is [0, ∞), therefore the stock of machines of vintage τ ∈ [−ω, 0] which are present in the firm at time t = 0 is considered as exogenous and will be denoted by K 0 (τ ). These machines have age −τ at time t = 0 and may be in use untill they reach age ω. Machines of vintage τ > 0 may be in use for ages s ∈ [0, ω], and their stock at age zero equals zero. Therefore K 0 (τ ) will be defined as zero for τ > 0. The ages of possible use of any vintage can be written as [s 0 (τ ), ω], where s 0 (τ ) = max{0, −τ }.
Summarizing, the dynamics of each vintage τ ∈ [−ω, ∞) is given by the equatioṅ
where "dot" means everywhere the derivative with respect to s (the argument representing the age).
The productivity of machines of vintage τ is denoted by f (τ ), while g(τ ) denotes the emission per machine of vintage τ . The firm faces costs due to emissions at an exogenous price v(t) per unit of emission (this price will be endogenized later on). Due to this cost the firm may decide to (possibly temporarily) switch off a part of the machines. Let us denote by W (τ, s) ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of the machines of vintage τ that operate at age s.
The cost of investment I in s years old machines of any vintage will be denoted by C(s, I).
The present value (at time t = 0) of the total production of machines of vintage τ , discounted with a rate r, is
the cost of emission is The firm maximizes the aggregated over time discounted net revenue, that is, solves the problem
subject to (1) .
The emission of the firm at time t > 0 is given by the expression
Remark 1 Due to the specific form of the problem there is an easy way to define optimality even though the optimal value in (2) may be infinite. Namely (I * , W * , K * ) is a solution of (2), (1) if for any T > 0 the restriction of these functions to
} is an optimal solution of the problem in which the integration in (2) is carried out on D T .
Problem (2), (1) fits to the general framework of heterogeneous optimal control systems developed in [15] . However, the present problem can be treated also by the classical Pontryagin optimality conditions for ODEs since it decomposes along vintages: every technology vintage τ ∈ [−ω, ∞) is managed separately by solving the problem
If for any fixed
) is a solution of this problem, then (I, W, K) is a solution of (2), (1) and vice versa. 2 The following is assumed throughout the paper.
(A1) The exogenous data K 0 , f , g are non-negative and continuous, f and g are continuously differentiable, g > 0, f > 0, g ≤ 0, r ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0; (A2) The cost function C(s, i) is two times differentiable in i, the derivatives C i and
Under these conditions problem (2), (1) Since W enters only in the objective function, clearly we have
The optimal control i * of problem (4), (5) for a fixed τ and v(·) is easy to obtain by applying the Pontryagin maximum principle [13] . Namely,
where ξ −→ (C i ) −1 (s, ξ) is the inverse of the function i −→ C i (s, i) and ξ * (s) is the unique solution of the adjoint equatioṅ
According to (6) the solution ξ is nonnegative, hence (C i ) −1 (s, ξ * (s)) is well defined due to (A2).
The emission mapping
An exogenously given price of emission, that is a function v(t) as in assumption (A3), determines the optimal emission of the firm
where
) is the optimal solution at the firm level corresponding to v. In this section we investigate in some more details the mapping
Since the emission restriction takes effect at timet, we consider v as equal to zero beforet. For a technical convenience we assume thatt ≥ ω, although this is not essential.
Denote by V the space of all measurable and locally bounded functions v : [0, ∞) → R that equal zero on [0,t). The space V will be sometimes considered as a subspace of L loc ∞ (0, ∞), the latter consisting of all measurable function that are bounded on every bounded interval [0, T ].
The next proposition claims a specific Lipschitz continuity property of E * . Since we allow for negative values of v we denote v − = min{0, v}. In the text below we shall use also the notation
There is a constant c and a non-increasing function [0, ∞) t −→ γ t > 0 such that for every v , v ∈ V and t >t
Proof. The function γ t can be explicitly defined as
, which is strictly positive according to (A2).
. We have
Using (6) we obtain from the adjoint equation (8), which is satisfied by
is an upper bound for g, and we use that χ is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant equal to one.
From assumption (A2) we easily obtain that (C i ) −1 (s, ·) is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant 1/ε C , thus according to (7)
Then from (1) or (5) we obtain that
Thus the first term in (10) can be estimated by
To estimate the second term in (10) we first note that by a similar argument as above we estimate
Using that the function (
is Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant ≤ 1/ε C , which is implied by in a standard way by (A2), and (7) we obtain that
Hence, using that t ≥t ≥ ω,
It remains to estimate the term
) and σ(τ, v (t)) are both positive or both non-positive, 1 otherwise in (10) . To do this we compare the functions σ(τ, v (t)) and σ(τ, v (t)), assuming without any restriction that v (t) ≤ v (t). Clearly ∆W (τ, t − τ ) = 0 (and equals one) for some τ ∈ [t − ω, t] if and only if σ(τ, v (t)) ≤ 0 < σ(τ, v (t)).
Note also that if v < 0, then σ(τ, v) and σ(τ, 0) have both positive signs, hence the sign of σ(τ, v) does not change if we replace v with v + := max{0, v}. Since |v + − v + | ≤ |v − v |, the estimations below would not change if we replace v (t) and v (t) with v (t) + and v (t) + , or equivalently, if we assume that v (t) ≥ 0.
Due to (A2) (implying that σ(τ, v) is strictly increasing for v ≥ 0) and (A3) the set
(if nonempty) is an interval (τ − ν,τ ], where σ(τ , v (t)) = 0 and σ(τ − ν, v (t)) ≥ 0. Then
Subtracting the above equality from σ(τ − ν, v (t)) ≥ 0 we obtain that
Since
we have according to (A2) that
Then (14) and g (τ ) ≤ 0 imply
Thus the measure of the set in (13) does not exceedḡ γt |v (t) − v (t)|. Combining this with (12), (11) and (10) we obtain the claim of the proposition. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 For every v ∈ V and t ≥t the value E * [v](t) depends only on the restriction of v to
Proof. The proof of this lemma is straightforward:
The analysis of the market price of emissions in the next section involves a rather complicated functional equation for v. Together with the general case we consider also a particular cost function C(s, I) for which the equation substantially simplifies.
, is a measurable non-increasing function.
The advantage of the above assumption, which is still economically meaningful, is that the optimal investment becomes a linear function of the "shadow price" of the capital stock. Namely, (7) becomes
where ξ(τ, ·) is the solution of the adjoint equation (8) , that is,
Notice that due to (A1) the function τ −→ σ(τ, v), restricted to an interval [t − ω, t], either has a definite sign or has a single zero in this interval, denoted further by θ(t, v). In addition, we set
, respectively. With this notation we have, according to (6) , that W * [v](τ, t − τ ) = 1 for t ∈ (τ, τ + ω) if and only if τ ∈ (θ(t, v(t)), t).
Lemma 2 Let assumptions (A1) and (A4) hold and let v ∈ V. Then for every t ≥t
where a ∨ b := max{a, b} and
The proof of this lemma uses the Cauchy formula for the solution ξ of the adjoint equation (16) , the formula (15) for the optimal control, the Cauchy formula for the corresponding solution K * [v] of (1), and (9). This results in an expression for E * [v](t) in the form of a triple intgral depending only on the data and v, from which one can derive the expression in the lemma after a sequence of changes of the order and the variables of integration. We skip the cumbersome calculations.
Definition. We call the price function v ∈ V regular if f (τ ) − v(t)g(τ ) > 0 for all τ ≥ 0 and t ∈ (τ, τ + ω).
In other words, regularity means that the price v(t) does not invoke switch-off of existing machines. In the context of the emission restrictions the existence of a regular auction price (see next section) would mean that the environmental goals can be achieved only by appropriate investment policies (without premature scrapping).
For a regular v ∈ V the expression for E * [v] substantially simplifies, since θ(t, v(t)) = t − ω for all t ≥t. Hence,
Having in mind the definition of σ(τ, v) we split each of the above outer integrals into two parts: one term depending on v, the other -independent of v. The resulting expression that is independent of v is exactly the emission corresponding to v(t) ≡ 0. Having in mind also that v(t) = 0 for t <t we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Let assumptions (A1) and (A4) hold and let v ∈ V be regular. Then for every t ≥t
The following properties of the kernel ϕ(t, ·) play a role in the study of the auction price of emissions defined in the next section.
Lemma 4 Let assumptions (A1) and (A4) hold. Then for every t >t the function ϕ(t, ·) : [t − ω, t + ω] has the following properties:
is strictly positive (negative) on (t − ω, t) (on (t, t + ω), respectively).
That is, the "mass" of the kernel ϕ(t, ·) is concentrated mostly around α = t.
The auction price of permits and its regularization
We consider an economy consisting of n identical firms described by the model considered in Section 2. LetÊ(t) be a cap for the emission permits of the economy for t ≥t. As before we assume that the cap takes effect at timet ≥ ω and is known by the firms at time t = 0 for all the future.
The emission permits are auctioned at timet. The main issue investigated in this section is: does the auction (the primary market) really determine the price v(t)? Since the answer is "NO", we analyze theoretically and numerically the primary market behavior and the appearance of market failure.
The equation for the auction price of emission permits, v(t), is
The market would determine the price of permits if (i) equation (18) has a solution v(·) ∈ V;
(ii) the solution is unique; (iii) the solution is positive for all t.
In general, neither of the above requirement is fulfilled. The first needs assumptions for the data, and these assumptions are difficult to specify due to the complexity of equation (18) (even in the special case considered in Lemma 3). The second requirement is obviously not fulfilled if, for example,Ê(t) ≡ 0, since if v is a solution of (18), then everyṽ withṽ(t) > v(t) would also be a solution. Even if the above two possibilities could be classified as "academic", as we show below, a failure of the third requirement could be rather realistic.
In the simplest case, in which the price function v solving (18) is regular, it solves also the equation
(we skip the division by n consideringÊ(t) as already divided by n). This is a Fredholm integral equation of the first kind on the infinite interval [t, +∞). Such equations are inherently ill-posed.
To see that it is enough to add to a solution v a highly fluctuating term, such as sin(nt). Then v(t) + sin(nt) would be a solution of the same equation with the right-hand side modified by the quantity t+ω t∨(t−ω) ϕ(t, α) sin(nα) dα, which is arbitrarily small when n is large enough. Thus an arbitrarily small disturbance in the right-hand side can lead to a finite (even arbitrarily large) change of the solution. This difficulty is caused by the smoothing effect on v of the integration with ϕ: high-frequency components of v are "smoothed out". Therefore one can expect that computing v would tend to amplify any high-frequency component or irregularity of the right-hand side. In effect, the right-hand side of (19) has to be somewhat "smoother" than the solution v in order to obtain satisfactory numerical approximation [9] .
A good numerical method to solve a Fredholm integral equation of the first kind should be able to somehow filter out the high-frequency components in the singular value expansion of the solution (if such exists). Different methods of regularization aimed at finding reasonable numerical approximation to the solution are known ( [14, 5, 11] ). However, we stress that our aim is not just to solve the price equation (19) or some of its more complicated nonlinear versions (say, that resulting from Lemma 2). Our ultimate goal is to imitate the behavior of the auction market, therefore the regularization we apply for solving (18) should be implementable also in the real auction market. We argue below and in the next section that a relevant regularization mean is to formulate the emission constraint (18) period-wise, rather than at any time instant. This amounts to applying regularization by time-aggregation, related to the Nyström's method [5, Chapter 12] . In contrast to the celebrated singular expansion/decomposition this method is directly applicable also in the general (nonlinear) case of (18) and has a clear policy implementation. Namely, we introduce the discrete version of the emission mapping E * as follows. Assume that an emission restriction is given period-wise:Ê k = intensity in the time-period [t k−1 , t k ]. For simplicity we assume that all time periods have the same length h > 0, thus t k = kh, and also that ω = mh,t =kh for appropriate natural numbers m and k. Correspondingly, the price of emission will be constant, v k , on each interval [t k−1 , t k ) and zero for k ≤k. Thus instead of the space V of price functions we consider
which can be viewed as a subset of V by piece-wise constant embedding of V h in V. The emission resulting from v ∈ V h becomes a vector
Lemma 1 can be directly translated to the discrete case. It claims that
Then instead of the price equation (18) we consider the equation (skipping again the division by n) E * h
Under the conditions of Lemma 3 the period-wise version of the emission as function of v ∈ V h becomes (after a change of the order of integration):
where B ki is the square
is the triangle with vertices {(t k−m−1 , t k−1 ), (t k−m , t k−1 ), (t k−m , t k )}, and B k,k+m is the triangle with vertices {(t k+m−1 , t k−1 ), (t k+m−1 , t k ), (t k+m , t k )}. However, the numerical analysis given in the next section, as well as the proposition below apply to the general case of an emission map
In the rest of this section we address the issue of existence of a solution to the (nonlinear nonsmooth) equation (21) for v ∈ V h . First of all we claim a certain Lipschitz continuity property of the mapping E * h , similarly as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Assume that (A1)-(A3)
hold. There is a constant c and a function γ t > 0 (the same as in Proposition 1) such that for every v , v ∈ V h and k >k
The claim of this proposition follows directly from Proposition 1 and (20).
In the existence result presented below we consider the truncated version of equation (21). That is, given the aggregation time-step h > 0 we solve the finite system of equations
with respect to v = (vk +1 , . . . , v M ) where M is presumably a large number, so that T = M h is also "very large". According to the discrete version of Lemma 1, It as a rather difficult task to prove that the solutions of (23) would converge to a solution of (21) when M −→ +∞ (this is not simple also in the linear case (22)). The truncation of the time horizon is based on the common belief that the (hypothetical) knowledge of the economic factors thousands of years from now would not essentially influence the behavior of the economic agents in the next 100 years. Still, the plausibility of the truncation is not evident due to the possibly unlimited technological progress (this is clearly exhibited by the requirement (24) in the proof of the proposition below).
Another support for the truncation of the time horizon is provided by our numerical experiments, where the auction price for the next 80 years (to which we restrict the numerical analysis in the next section) remains practically the same when (23) is solved for T = M h = 150 or more years, and also when the parameters v M +1 , . . . , v M +m vary in a reasonable range (taking all of them equal to zero is a relevant choice, since it means that no emission cap is posed after time T = M h).
Proposition 3 Let M >k andē > 0 be arbitrarily fixed. Then there existsv such that for everŷ
Proof. First we shall define the numberv by the requirements
.
The above definition ofv applies to the more interesting case h < ω. The alternative case requires minor changes in the last inequality.
After havingv fixed so that (24) are satisfied we denote
The proof utilizes the Brawer fixed point theorem. Therefore we reformulate system (23) as a fixed point equation:
and β k > 0 are chosen in such a way that
The above maximum exists due to the continuity of E * h k [v] and the compactness of V M h (v).
We shall prove that
, which would imply the claim of the proposition due to the Brawer fix point theorem, since F is continuous and
Take an arbitrary v ∈ V M h (v) and k ∈ {k + 1, . . . , M }. All we have to prove is that −v ≤ F k (v) ≤v.
To prove the second inequality we consider two cases:
≤v/2 +v/2 =v according to the choice of β k .
To prove that F k (v) ≥ −v we consider the next two cases. 
Let
Then from the adjoint equation (8) we have that for
where we use the last inequality in (24). Then from (1) we obtain that for τ ∈ [t k − ω, t k−1 ] and
Finally we estimate
=ē.
Using this we obtain
This proves the invariance on V M h (v) with respect to F and the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Thus Proposition 2 ensures at least a positive answer to the issue (i) in the beginning of the section at least for the truncated equation (23). Then in the special case where assumption (A4) and (23) has a regular solution v with the natural choice of the parameters v M +1 = . . . , = v M +m = 0, this this must be the unique regular solution (due to the freedom in the choice of the right-hand sidê E k ). Issue (iii) from the beginning of this section remains unclear, and will be somewhat enlightened by the numerical experiments in the next section. Here we only mention that under (A4) and the assumptionÊ(t) = E * [0](t) (that is if the cap starts from the unconstrained emission att) the market equation (18) cannot have a regular positive solution. Indeed, if it has a regular solution v, then v solves also (19). This equation applied for t =t shows that v cannot be positive on (t,t + ω) due to Lemma 4.
Numerical analysis of the market price of emission
In this section we present some experimental results for the auction price of permits assuming that the firms participating to the auction are identical (thus the price is determined by equation (18), if a positive solution exists). In particular we investigate the role of the aggregation step h. Following the terminology used under the Kyoto protocol, we shall call it a commitment period) and h will be its length. 4 The existence and the regularity of the auction price for emission permits will be scrutinized for different h.
The following data specifications are used in the experiments: In the first group of plots (figures 1 and 2) a constant emission capÊ(t) = 300 is imposed at timet = 30. This cap is below the level of emission that would be produced without any emission restriction (represented by the dash-dotted line in the Fig. 1 ). The solid line represents the emission of the firm obeying the cap. It is remarkable that the reduction of the emission of the firm begins much earlier thant = 30 -this is the so called anticipation effect. The left plot in Fig. 2 represents the price of the emission permits in the primary market (as auctioned). In fact, it is obtained by using a small commitment periods of h = 1 year. The price is highly oscillating close to the time at which the cap is imposed, as it is expected from the explanations given at the beginning of Section 4. The right plot corresponds to a commitment periods of h = 5 years, for which the fluctuations of the price are substantially lower. Although the primary market is efficient in the considered test example (that is, it determines a positive price of the emissions) a larger commitment period h clearly decreases the volatility of the market.
In Fig. 3 the emission cap imposed at time t = 30 is first constant, starting from the emission level before the beginning of the emission restriction (the dash-dotted line represents the unrestricted emissions), then it decreases quadratically. The solid line represents the emission of the firm obeying the cap. Here it is remarkable that (in contrast to the first scenario) there is no visible reduction of the emission level before time t = 30, i.e. no visible anticipation effect. This phenomenon will be discussed in more detail in the continuation of the present paper. The right plot in Fig. 3 represents the auctioned price of the emission permit. As before it is obtained by using small commitment periods of h = 1 year. In contrast to the first scenario, here the auction fails in two time-periods. First this happens immediately after the introduction of the emission cap at timet = 30, then around the change of the shape of the cap in year t = 50: the solution of the auction equation (18) takes negative values. In addition, the solution is highly oscillating around these times. The regularization of the market by posing the cap in commitment periods is seen on Fig. 4 . The left plot corresponds to commitment periods of h = 5 years. The market still fails immediately after the introduction of the cap, but not around the change of the shape of the cap. The right plot in Fig. 4 represents the price function with commitment periods of 10 years. The market is now efficient and looks quite regular. 
